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NOTE
BOWLES V. RUSSELL:1 THEY GOT ME ON
A TECHNICALITY
Vincent Pavlish*
I. INTRODUCTION
What role should courts play in our lives? Should they be mere arbi-
ters of disputes? Should they be clockwork microcosms of the ever-grow-
ing technocracy? Or should they support and promote justice? District
court arbiters of justice make all sorts of technical decisions that affect de-
fendants in every trial. Two days, for example, is nothing to most people,
but it was everything to Keith Bowles. The decision in Bowles v. Russell
prevented Bowles from exhausting judicial review of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. The decision throws into sharp relief the harsh effect of
arbitrary, mandatory deadlines, and it leaves the common legal practitioner
with a serious question: Does the judicial system stand for justice?
Modern law is practiced in the shadow of what might be called the
procedural enlightenment. In the last 50 years, the United States Supreme
Court adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure,2 the Rules of Evidence, 3 the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 4 and numerous other rules governing legal
practice. Perhaps now is a good time to take an honest look to see if there
* Vincent Pavlish, candidate for J.D. 2009, The University of Montana School of Law.
1. Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007) [hereinafter Bowles III].
2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were originally enacted by Congress in 1938. Kevin M.
Clermont, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6 (Found. Press 2006). There were "significant amend-
ments to the Civil Rules" between 1961 and 1983. Id. at 7.
3. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88
Stat. 1926 (1975).
4. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure became effective on July 1, 1968. Or. of the S. Ct.
§ 2 (Dec. 4, 1967).
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are casualties to this mighty revolution. Keith Bowles may well be such a
casualty. His lawyer relied on a district court order and filed a notice of
appeal two days outside an arbitrary deadline for notice of appeal in the
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 5 The United States Supreme Court denied
Bowles his habeas appeal. 6
In an attempt to streamline the administration of justice, the Supreme
Court classifies many rules as jurisdictional. Without jurisdiction a court
has no power to act. Classifying a rule as jurisdictional may determine
whether someone will remain free or be jailed. Consequently, courts should
be cautious in their classifications.
In light of policy concerns and precedent, this note assesses the Bowles
decision to classify statutory time prescriptions as "jurisdictional." Section
I presents the factual and procedural background of Bowles. Section II ex-
amines the rules at issue and highlights the Court's recent decision to rede-
fine some jurisdictional rules as mere claim-processing rules. Section III
explores how the Bowles decision departs from recent precedent. In Sec-
tion IV, I argue that time prescriptions should not be classified as jurisdic-
tional so that courts can provide equitable relief in cases of excusable neg-
lect.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF BOWLES V. RUSSELL
While the outcome of Bowles depended on a procedural fact, one must
remember that procedure is not the substance of law. The State accused a
man of murder. Failing to recognize the significance of this charge may
well be the reason the Court failed to provide justice in Bowles.
A. The Murder of Ollie T. Gipson
Keith Bowles was indicted for the murder of Ollie T. Gipson. 7 Gipson
died after his skull was fractured by repeated blows to the head., The coro-
ner believed someone weighing between 220 and 240 pounds delivered the
killing blow by jumping on Gipson's head.9 Bowles did not jump on Gip-
son's head-Richard "Snoop" Hayden did. 10 Bowles threw a punch and
likely kicked Gipson in the legs or stomach, but Bowles did not directly
cause Gipson's death. 11
5. Bowles 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
6. Id. at 2362-2363.
7. Br. of Petr. at 3, Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2005).
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.
Vol. 70
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How was Bowles charged with murder? Bowles, Snoop, and two
other friends went to see a rap concert at a bar called Hellbusters in Fairport
Harbor, Ohio. 12 They left the bar and traveled a few miles along Lake
Eerie to a town called Painesville for an after-hours party.13 On the drive,
they happened upon Snoop's injured cousin Marcus "Choc" Moore, as well
as Mike Mann and Kenneth "Squeak" Taylor.' 4 Mann and Squeak told
Snoop that they had been jumped by Antonio "Stickman" Rymer and Ken-
neth "Dirty" Johnson.15
Seeking retribution, the troupe traveled to the Argonne Arms Apart-
ment complex where they saw Stickman shooting at someone.1 6 Ollie T.
Gipson, the victim, was with Stickman. Gipson approached the car "in a
menacing manner with his hand in his shirt." Gipson's body posture led the
others to believe that he had a gun.i7 In response, Bowles threw a punch at
Gipson but missed. 8 His companions knocked Gipson to the ground.
Bowles kicked Gipson once and then returned to the car. 19 While Gipson
was down Snoop stomped on his head three times.20
Soon afterward another man approached with a gun, but Snoop
knocked the gun away. 21 Bowles then jumped out of the car to retrieve the
gun and brought it back to the car. 22 Dirty came out to help Gipson and the
man who brought the gun. 23 A shot was fired, and the action stopped. 24
Eventually the police arrived on the scene and directed Snoop and the
others to leave.25 After discarding the rifle in a nearby dumpster, Snoop,
Bowles, and the others left. 26
B. Bowles's Technical Misstep
Bowles was charged under an Ohio felony-murder statute. 27 Bowles
was found guilty by a jury that he contends had a racial imbalance. 28 On
12. State v. Bowles, 2001 WL 502042 at *I (Ohio App. 11 th Dist. May 11, 2001) [hereinafter
Bowles I].
13. Id.
14. Br. of Petr., supra n. 7, at 4.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 4-5.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id.
20. Br. of Petr., supra n. 7, at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 5-6.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Br. of Petr., supra n' 7, at 6.
27. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.02(b) (West 1998).
28. Bowles I, 2001 WL 502042 at *2.
2009
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appeal, Bowles complains of thirteen errors. 29 The Ohio courts granted him
no relief, and Bowles filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court in the Northern District of Ohio. 30 A person seeking a writ of habeas
corpus must allege that "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States." 31 The district court, on the advice of
a magistrate, rejected Bowles's habeas petition.32
Bowles had thirty days to file a notice of appeal. 33 He missed that
deadline but moved the court to reopen the period in which he could file his
notice of appeal.34 The judge can reopen this period for fourteen days from
the day the motion is granted. 35 "[I]nexplicably," the district court re-
opened the period for seventeen days-three days beyond the time allotted
by the rule.36 Bowles filed his motion on day sixteen-two days late. 37
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the appeal as untimely. 38
The court admonished, "[This] is a case about missed deadlines. At times,
they go unnoticed, but sometimes the lapse is fatal. This case presents one
of the fatal variety." 39 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider whether Rule 4 was jurisdictional and thus whether it would
block Bowles's habeas appeal (and a claim-processing rule that allows for
equitable exceptions). 40
III. APPELLATE RULES IMPOSING TIME PRESCRIPTIONS: JURISDICTIONAL
OR MERELY MANDATORY?
The time requirement involved in this case is not complicated. Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) provides:
Reopening the Time to File an Appeal. The district court may reopen the
time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when its order to
reopen is entered, but only if all the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered
or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice of the entry, which-
ever is earlier;
29. Id. at *1-2.
30. Bowles v. Russell, 2003 WL 25501341 (N.D. Ohio July 10, 2003) [hereinafter Bowles I1].
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2007).
32. Bowles II, 2003 WL 25501341, slip op. at 1.
33. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a).
34. Bowles III, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
35. 28 U.S.C § 2107(c).
36. Bowles 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
37. Id.
38. Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668, 677 (6th Cir. 2005).
39. Id. at 669.
40. Bowles 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2363.
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(B) the court finds that the moving party was entitled to notice of the entry of
the judgment or order sought to be appealed but did not receive the notice
from the district court or any party within 21 days after entry; and
(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.4 1
Also relevant to this case is Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 2, which
provides:
Rule 2: Suspension of Rules
On its own or a party's motion, a court of appeals may-to expedite its deci-
sion or for other good cause-suspend any provision of these rules in a partic-
ular case and order proceedings as it directs, except as otherwise provided in
Rule 26(b). 42
The exception provides:
(b) Extending Time. For good cause, the court may extend the time pre-
scribed by these rules or by its order to perform any act, or may permit an act
to be done after that time expires. But the court may not extend the time to
file:
(1) a notice of appeal (except as authorized in Rule 4) or a petition for permis-
sion to appeal; or
(2) a notice of appeal from or a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, modify,
enforce, or otherwise review an order of an administrative agency, board,
commission, or officer of the United States, unless specifically authorized by
law. 43
While these rules provide a general operating procedure, they do not specif-
ically mention jurisdiction. To determine whether a rule is jurisdictional or
not, a court generally turns to precedent, but the case law is not entirely
clear because there are at least two lines of cases attempting to provide a
general rule.
A. Rules of Court as Mandatory and Jurisdictional
Jurisdiction is the power of a court. Subject-matter jurisdiction is the
power a court has over types or classes of cases, and personal jurisdiction is
the power over individual parties. 4 4 If a court lacks jurisdiction, then it
lacks the power to decide a legal question or to force a party to follow its
decision. 4 5
Congress controls the appellate jurisdiction of federal courts. 46 There-
fore, any time Congress speaks on any subject that might change a court
docket, it may also limit the jurisdiction of the courts. Some precedent
suggests congressionally approved time limits should be enforced strictly.
41. Fed. R. App. P. 4(6)(a).
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 26(b).
44. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 452; U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
2009
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For example, the Bowles majority cites the 1883 case Scarborough v.
Pargoud.4 7 There, an attorney missed a deadline for a writ of error by one
day.4 8 The Court held, "[T]he writ of error was not brought within the time
limited by law, and we have consequently no jurisdiction. ''49
The Court also considered time limits to be jurisdictional rules after
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in United States v.
Robinson.50 In that case, the defendant and his attorney had a misunder-
standing as to whom would file the notice of appeal.51 There, the Court
described the ten-day deadline in Rule 37(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure as "mandatory and jurisdictional. '52
Similarly, the Court also said that a rule requiring notice to parties is
"mandatory and jurisdictional." 53 In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., a
legal secretary omitted one party's name on the notice of appeal. 54 The
Court held that jurisdiction over the party could not be established despite
the use of "et al." on the notice.55 Although Justice Scalia concurred in the
opinion, he claimed, "[By] definition all rules of procedure are technicali-
ties; sanction for failure to comply with them always prevents the court
from deciding where justice lies in a particular case."'56
B. Rules of Court as Emphatic, but Not Jurisdictional
Not all jurists share the hard-line perspective for all procedural mat-
ters. For example, Justice Brennan dissents from the holding in Torres:
"[The] Federal Rules ... reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill
in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome." 57 He is
bothered by the failure of the Court to look into the reality of the situation
and to weigh the equity of unnecessary notice against simple misstep.5 8 In
support of his position he cites Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which permits "courts of appeals to forgive noncompliance. '5 9
Recently, the Court seemed to move toward Justice Brennan's view of
the procedural rules as applied to jurisdiction. For example, the Court
47. Bowles 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2364; Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U.S. 567 (1883).
48. Scarborough, 108 U.S. at 567.
49. Id. at 568.
50. U.S. v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
51. Id. at 221.
52. Id. at 224.
53. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315 (1988).
54. Id. at 313.
55. Id. at 317-318.
56. Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 319-320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 320.
59. Torres, 487 U.S. at 324.
Vol. 70
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granted certiorari in Kontrick v. Ryan to explore whether a bankruptcy
rule's time restraint was jurisdictional. 60 Justice Ginsberg, in a unanimous
decision, wrote that cases like Robinson have misused the term "jurisdic-
tion" when referring to time prescriptions in rules of court.61 She opined
that "[jurisdiction] . . . is a word of many, too many, meanings." 62 The
Kontrick Court preferred that the term "jurisdiction" refer to prescriptions
of the subject-matter and personal jurisdiction only.63
The appellant in Kontrick conceded the rule in that case was not juris-
dictional but argued that claim-processing rules are substantially the same
and that they should be treated the same by the courts.64 The Court rejected
this equation because rules of court, liberally construed, should "account for
the parties' litigation conduct." 65 A court applying the rule as essentially
jurisdictional could not take litigation conduct into account.
One benefit of considering time prescriptions as non-jurisdictional is
that it allows courts to weigh equities and consider honest mistakes. The
Kontrick Court viewed an emphatic time limit as an affirmative defense. 66
The reasoning in Kontrick has allowed the Court to modify time prescrip-
tions in cases of "excusable neglect." 67 For example, in Harris Truck Lines
v. Cherry Meat Packers, a party missed a deadline because the attorney
relied on a district court's time extension that was later withdrawn. 68 The
Supreme Court excused the neglect because of "the obvious great hard-
ship."'69 The Court reemphasized this holding two years later in Thompson
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, a case with similar procedural
facts as Bowles.70 There, a party relied on a district court order affirming
an earlier mistake by the party.7  This line of cases provides an exception
for "unique circumstances" faced by parties in litigation.
60. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452. The bankruptcy rule at issue, Rule 4004, is explained earlier in the
case. See id. at 448.
61. Id. at 454.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 455.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456.
67. Harris Truck Lines v,. Cherry Meat Packers, 371 U.S. 215, 217 (1962).
68. Id. at 216.
69. Id. at 217.
70. Thompson v. Jmmig. & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964).
71. Id.
2009
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IV. THE METHOD AND MADNESS OF THE Bowles Decision
A. Majority
Confronted with Bowles, a five-to-four majority affirmed the judgment
of the Sixth Circuit and dismissed Bowles's habeas appeal for want of juris-
diction.72 The United States Supreme Court asserts that it "consistently
held that the requirement of filing a timely notice of appeal is 'mandatory
and jurisdictional.' "73 The Court rejects recent precedent that classified
time-prescription rules as a claim-processing issue, rather than a jurisdic-
tional issue. Instead, it cites a litany of case law classifying rules as either
"mandatory and jurisdictional" or simply as "jurisdiction[al]. '74
The Court then distinguishes Bowles from Kontrick. According to the
Court, Kontrick relied on "the fact that '[n]o statute ... specifies a time
limit for filing a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge'" under the
bankruptcy rules.75 The Court offers examples of claim-processing rules
beyond Kontrick.76 These examples include statutorily-imposed employee
number requirements, 77 as well as a statutory restriction on the availability
of attorney's fees. 78 By unanimous decision, both of these rules are claim-
processing rules. 79 According to the Court, Bowles rests on a statute with a
delineated time prescription that makes it more than a mere "claim-process-
ing rule."80
Noting that Congress determines the scope of the federal courts' appel-
late jurisdiction, the Bowles majority reasons that treating a time prescrip-
tion, like that in Rule 4, as jurisdictional "makes good sense."8, Thus,
when Congress lays down a mandatory time limit for appeals, it limits fed-
eral jurisdiction to cases filed before the deadline lapses.8 2 This shifts the
burden of inequity from the courts to Congress.8 3
Finally, the Court rejects Bowles's appeal for an equitable exception.8 4
This holding flows necessarily from the determination that the rules are
jurisdictional, but the Court goes further. It comments that an equitable
72. Bowles Ii, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 2363-2364.
75. Id. at 2364 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 448).
76. Id. at 2364-2365.
77. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 540 U.S. 500, 505 (2006).
78. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004).
79. Bowles 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2367 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2366 (majority).
81. Id. at 2365.
82. Id. at 2365-2366.
83. Id. at 2367.
84. Id. at 2366.
Vol. 70
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exception like this would always be inappropriate because the Court is
without legitimate authority to affect its subject-matter jurisdiction.85 Thus
the Court also overrules Harris and Thompson, seeing "no compelling rea-
son to resurrect the 'unique circumstances' doctrine from its 40-year slum-
ber." 86
B. Dissent
To say that the dissent "disagrees" does not adequately capture the
rancor in this four-member dissent. Justice Souter lambastes the majority,
writing, "[It] is intolerable for the judicial system to treat people this way,
and there is not even a technical justification for condoning this bait and
switch." 87 He then argues that the Court's recent precedent was a unani-
mous repudiation of the Robinson decision, relied on by the majority.8
The dissent states the harsh impacts of treating mandatory time limits
as jurisdictional to explain the pall over Robinson.89 Treating the
mandatory time prescriptions as claim-processing rules, on the other hand,
allows courts to make equitable exceptions in cases like Bowles.90
The dissent advocates that Congress must specifically mark a statute as
jurisdictional for it to carry that force. 91 In other words, the default position
should be that the statutory requirement is non-jurisdictional. The dissent
finds no significant mark of jurisdiction on Rule 4.92 Moreover, the dissent
argues that the majority disingenuously finds this "jurisdictional" tag by
citing dicta in other cases, without considering later repudiations.
93
The dissent would not overrule the "unique circumstances" doctrine
employed by the Harris and Thompson Courts. 94 Rather, rules like this are
analogous to statutes of limitations, notably non-jurisdictional time limits. 95
The dissent finds that the Thompson case requires the Court to create an
equitable exception for Bowles. Perhaps Bowles has an even stronger argu-
ment for an equitable exception because, unlike Thompson, where the party
85. Bowles 1I1, 127 S. Ct. at 2366.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2367 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2368.
90. Id. at 2369.
91. Bowles I1, 127 S. Ct. at 2368.
92. Id.
93. Id. at n. 3.
94. Id. at 2370.
95. Id. at 2369; Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006); Irwin v. Dept. of Vets. Affairs, 498
U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
2009
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independently erred, Bowles relied on an incorrect date given by the district
court judge. 96
V. ANALYSIS
A. Policy Considerations
While policy seems to drive the arguments in Bowles, neither the ma-
jority nor the dissent weigh the policy openly. However, the Court variably
identifies two competing policies: deference to Congress and fundamental
fairness.
Deference to Congress is and should be the paramount value in this
case. The majority rightly recognizes that Congress is charged with con-
trolling the appellate jurisdiction of the courts. 97 However, as the dissent
points out, Congress is not always controlling the appellate jurisdiction of
the courts when it approves a mandatory time limit.98 The majority never
answers how one should know when Congress intends to make a rule juris-
dictional. This question is important because deference to Congress also
requires the Court to exercise equitable discretion when a rule is not juris-
dictional. Knowing Congress's intent makes all of the difference.
In contrast, the dissent invokes basic fairness as the greater goal. 99
Striving for fairness seems particularly appropriate when a party's habeas-
corpus appeal fails because the party relied on a judge's error. However,
fairness can only be a goal if the question is not one of jurisdiction: whether
a court has the power to decide a legal question requires a different inquiry.
If the Supreme Court reached its decision on equitable grounds, it is hard to
imagine that Bowles would have been punished for the failures of the dis-
trict court. Sometimes the Court will punish a client for the failures of his
or her lawyer, but in a habeas case, where a defendant's freedom is on the
line, the stakes are too high for tough love.
B. Divining Jurisdiction: Why Rule 4 Should Not Be Construed
as Jurisdictional
Rules of procedure should be interpreted liberally to facilitate the reso-
lution of legitimate cases, rather than stunt the flow of the judicial pro-
cess. 100 The move toward standardized rules was specifically designed to
96. Bowles II, 127 S. Ct. at 2370-2371; Thompson, 375 U.S. at 385.
97. Bow/es I1, 127 S. Ct. at 2364 (majority).
98. Id. at 2368 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2370.
100. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(b) (West 2007). "[Rules of procedure and evidence] shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force
or effect after such rules have taken effect." Id.
Vol. 70
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remove the element of flim-flam from the old code pleading system.10 1 The
new rule systems changed law practice in two relevant ways. Rules became
relatively uniform, and liberal construction and escape valves like Rule 2
allowed judges leeway to act equitably.
Though not currently federal law, the better interpretation recognizes
procedural rules as, by default, non-jurisdictional, and a requirement only
becomes jurisdictional if Congress specifically demarcates a rule as juris-
dictional. 10 2 In fact, the Supreme Court sometimes applies exacting scru-
tiny in procedural cases to ensure that a decision is faithful to the substance
of a case and not just to the words written on the various legal docu-
ments. 10 3 No less should be demanded of the Court when it establishes
jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia supports the bright-line rule that all "strict" congres-
sional edicts should be construed as jurisdictional because "a permissive
construction is wrong."10 4 This all-or-nothing approach is akin to using a
jackhammer to break cr~me brfil~e. Sure, it will get the job done, leaving
no indecision or confusion, but a thoughtful practitioner will likely be left
thinking that there is a less caustic, fairer way. It is doubtful that Congress,
even enraged with some bloodlust, would set aside fair habeas petitions for
mistakes made by judges and based on arbitrary technicalities. Quite the
contrary, Congress is as equally fond of calling judges lazy or foolish as the
Supreme Court sometimes is of admonishing Congress. Regardless, the
jackhammer method seems to be the approach adopted by the Bowles ma-
jority for all statutory requirements. 10 5
The dissent gives a different answer to the question of procedural ri-
gidity, but their answer, too, seems insufficient. Their answer relies on
stare decisis.10 6 While this is enough in this case because Thompson and
Cherry are fairly close to the facts of Bowles, it does not give the practi-
tioner any reasonable guide as to how truly novel cases will be decided.
Still, the dissent offers a better directive than the majority. The majority
position may as well require that lawyers hire a divination expert to guess
when Congress has blessed a statute with the mantle of jurisdiction.
The structure of the United States Code indicates that this particular
rule might not be a jurisdictional concern. For example, the regulation does
not appear in the 'jurisdiction" section of the Code.' 0 7 This is not disposi-
101. Torres, 487 U.S. at 319-320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Bowles I1, 127 S. Ct. at 2368 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
103. See Browder v. Dir., 434 U.S. 257, 262 (1977).
104. Torres, 487 U.S. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Bowles 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2364 (majority).
106. Id. at 2370 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
107. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1631.
2009
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tive on the issue of Congress's intent. Rather, the title of the section and
absence of Rule 4 buttresses the view that this is not necessarily a jurisdic-
tional requirement.
On the other hand, Rule 4 is specifically separated by Congress as
mandatory and unchangeable. Rule 2-which allows the Court leeway-
explicitly excludes Rule 4 by reference to Rule 26(b). 10 8 Oddly, neither the
majority nor the dissent mentions this relationship despite the fact that the
separation tends to show that Congress intended this section to operate spe-
cially.
Liberal construction of the rules supports the view that time prescrip-
tions, like Rule 4, are non-jurisdictional. There is no plain indication from
Congress that Rule 4 should be treated as a jurisdictional rule. Since the
application of the rule may signify the end of the line for litigants with
serious concerns, the Court should not overreach and turn away good
claims. In fact, the policy of following Congress's directives dutifully
should nudge the Court to consider rules jurisdictional only when Congress
designates them so.
Finally, the majority rejects recent precedent. The majority and the
dissent rely on precedent rather than looking at the text or history of the
rules to determine congressional intent. Since the justices came to opposite
conclusions, it is hard to say that Congress's intent is clear. On the other
hand, Supreme Court precedent must mean something. Following the pre-
cedent chronologically lends credence to the view adopted by the dissent
because recent cases unanimously rejected the reasoning in Robinson.10 9
C. The "Unique Circumstances" Exception
The Thompson decision requires a court to forgive Bowles's untimely
filing because the circumstances are unique and require a special policy
consideration. In Thompson, the error was committed when a judge vali-
dated an invalid action by the party.I 0 The parties relied on the judge, and
the judge was in error, but the original error was made by the party. 11 The
factual scenario in Bowles is different because the original erring party was
the judge, not the attorney for Keith Bowles. Thus the special circumstance
of reliance on the district court should have played a role in the Supreme
Court's determination of this case.
However, the Court in Cherry and Thompson did not give a guide as to
what "unique circumstances" qualify for equitable leniency. The dissent in
108. See Fed. R. App. P. 2, 4, 26(b).
109. Bowles I1, 127 S. Ct. at 2367.
110. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 385.
111. Id.
Vol. 70
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Bowles focuses on the petitioner's reliance on a court order as reasona-
ble. 11 2 This seems fair, but the room for equitable leniency should be
broader. Rather than overruling reasonable precedent like Cherry and
Thompson, the Court should have overruled Torres. Forcing jurisdictional
error in a case where a secretary has made a minor clerical error is antitheti-
cal to justice.1 13 Justice Brennan's dissent in Torres offers the most
thoughtful test of how equity should fit into the Court's analysis. 1 4 He
says that a timely appeal should go forward even if a party has been left off
of the appeal if the "party's intention to ... appeal is clear to all and preju-
dicial to none."'1 15 Justice Brennan distinguishes this from the timeliness
issue because it was not presented in Torres and because the rule specifi-
cally sets timely notice apart.' 16 However, a liberal interpretation of the
rules that govern the notice of appeal should be fundamentally aimed at
exactly what Justice Brennan argued for in that case. Thus appeals should
not be hindered when a party's intention to appeal was clear to all and
prejudicial to none.
Bowles's appeal was clearly intentional and not prejudicial. The ap-
pellees knew Bowles appealed because the court granted a filing extension.
Besides, the appellees suffered no harm in the two days between the
mandatory end of the extension and the day that the actual notice was filed.
D. Court Interpretations of Bowles
Since the Bowles decision, courts of appeals have bent over backward
to show that their "unique circumstances" doctrine does not fall in Bowles's
wake. In Kahn v. United States Department of Justice, a notice of appeal
was filed one day late according to an administrative regulation. 11 7 The
filing arrived late because of a FedEx error during the Christmas season.118
The Second Circuit distinguished Bowles because the notice of appeal regu-
lation was an administrative regulation and not a direct edict from Con-
gress. 119 This conclusion smacks of acrobatics considering that Congress
generally approves rules of the Court without revision-much akin to the
way that Congress deals with administrative agencies.
Similarly, in National Ecological Foundation v. Alexander, the Sixth
Circuit held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) was different from
112. Bowles II1, 127 S. Ct. 2371.
113. Torres, 487 U.S. at 324-325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 321.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 320.
117. Kahn v. U.S. Dept. of Just., 494 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2007).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 258.
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Rule 4 because Rule 59(e) "was promulgated by the Supreme Court."120
This circuit court then compares Rule 59(e) to the rule in Kontrick and
concludes that it is a claim-processing rule and not subject to the Bowles
holding.1 21  Other courts have displayed similar acrobatics to evade
Bowles. 122
These courts are unwilling to recognize the depth of the gouge that
Bowles has left. This decision focuses on the authority to set rules in stone.
In the Bowles case, that authority rested with Congress, while in other cases
it may well rest with an agency under the authority of congressional aegis
or of a more local government. Bowles's holding follows Scalia's concur-
rence in Torres and makes deadlines absolute. It is just that simple. It is
just that unfair.
VI. CONCLUSION
Is the law really this unyielding to basic fairness? The majority re-
sponds that the law is what Congress makes it.123 Therefore, it does not
have to be so unyielding. Congress should change this rule. The fact that a
habeas petitioner was denied an appeal because of a judge's mistake should
move Congress to make rules more explicit regarding a court's power to
forgive honest mistakes.
The decision in Bowles is unfair. The legal community must help
Congress, as well as state and local governments, to make our judicial sys-
tem just. The client bears the brunt of justice dispensed to make a procedu-
ral point. Decisions like Bowles require lawyers to take a more active role
in the political process. Legislators will listen to lawyers who offer advice
on how to develop a more just system.
This case should frighten all lawyers. If relying on a district court
order can lead to a dismissal of a habeas appeal without a hearing on the
merits, then the entire system is in trouble. Lawyers have a great responsi-
bility to engage the people and the legislature to create fair laws. This
means that lawyers also bear the responsibility to maintain a system that
cannot be unjustly sidestepped or explained away.
120. Nat. Ecological Found. v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 475 (6th Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 475-476.
122. See U.S. v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1123 (10th Cir. 2007) (the court frames the question to focus
on the questionable starting date for the filing period). The dissent illustrates this point a little more
easily. Id. at 1136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). See also Bilbruck v. BNSF R.R., 243 Fed. Appx. 293, 295
(9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (distinguishing local rules from those passed on by Congress); U.S. v.
Garduno, 506 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing the time for filing criminal appeals from
civil appeals, despite the fact that they are both located in Rule 4).
123. Bowles 111, 127 S. Ct. at 2360, 2365.
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